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Statement of the Problem 
 
 Early juvenile courts were created with the principle of parens patriae.  For nearly a 
century, the juvenile court acted under the concept of rehabilitation.  In response to growing 
juvenile crime in the 1980s and 1990s, a majority of states in the U.S. responded  by expanding 
juvenile waiver laws.  The intent of juvenile waiver is  to remove juveniles from the system who 
are beyond rehabilitation and deter future crime.   
 
 There are three types of juvenile waiver:  Statutory exclusion laws, prosecutorial 
discretion, and juvenile waiver.  Juvenile waived is the most common, and the preferred method.   
The Supreme Court has set 8 criteria  for Judges to consider in their waiver decisions.  These 
include seriousness of the offense, manner in which the offense was carried out, injury to the 
victim, merit of the offense, disposition  of co-defendants, maturity of the juvenile, previous 
history, and rehabilitative efforts.  A look at those being waived reveals the typical offender is a 
male, at least 16-years-of age, and a minority.  
 
Method of Approach 
 
 This study will be an analysis of secondary data from peer reviewed studies in 
criminological journals.  Also being used is statistical data collected by the Office of Juvenile 
Delinquency Prevention, the National Juvenile Court Data Archives, the State of Wisconsin and 
the State of Utah.  Additional data sources include law review articles, Supreme Court Opinions, 
and current state statues. 
 
Results of the Study  
 
 Neither goal of juvenile waiver has been fulfilled.  Review of the literature shows that 
while some youth who are waived are long time offenders who have exhausted the resources of 
the juvenile court, others are first-time offenders.  Review of the literature also shows that 
juvenile waiver does not deter crime.  In many cases, juvenile waivers have shown to cause the 
opposite effect, and juveniles who are waived are more likely to commit future crime. 
  
 Juveniles who are waived face serious legal and personal consequences.  Juveniles 
prosecuted in the adult system are more likely to receive harsher punishment.  Juveniles are more 
likely to face juror bias in the adult court.  Juveniles who are sentenced to incarceration face 
serious issues.  Juveniles in prison are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted and twice 
as likely to be physically assaulted.  Most juveniles in prison are not rehabilitated and adapt a 
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Statement of the Problem 
 
 In 2008, juvenile courts in the United States handled approximately 1.7 million 
delinquency cases (Adams & Addie, 2011).  From these cases, approximately 1% were waived 
to the adult criminal justice system for prosecution.  Laws governing crimes committed by 
juveniles have been present since the earliest criminal codes (Griffin, Addie, Adams & Firestone, 
2011).  Judicial waiver laws were first introduced in the 1950s.  Waiver was rare and decisions to 
transfer a juvenile to adult court were left almost entirely to the discretion of Judges.  Prior to 
1970, a handful of states enacted automatic transfer laws, but only for the most serious of 
offenses (i.e. murder).  During the 1970s, and 1980s, all states saw an increase in juvenile crime.  
In response, nearly every state  enacted new legislation that either created new transfer 
mechanisms, expanded existing transfer laws, eliminated discretion in transfer decision making, 
and shifted authority from Judges to prosecutors (Griffin, 2008, p. 1). 
 Between 1985 and 1994, the number of juveniles waived to adult court increased by 90% 
(Adams & Addie, 2011).  The number of cases declined until 2001, when the number of 
juveniles waived slowly began to increase.  Some proponents of juvenile transfer argue that the 
reason for the decline is that prosecuting juveniles in adult court has a deterrent effect. Waiver of 
juvenile to adult court should accomplish two goals.  First, transfer should remove juveniles from 
the system who are beyond rehabilitation.  Second, transfer should be a mechanism to deter 
future crime (Steiner & Wright, 2006).  As Redding & Fuller (2004) explain, an underlying 
assumption to the policy is that the threat of stricter, adult punishments will act as a deterrent to 
future crime.  A review of the literature will show that this is simply not the case.  Adams and 
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Addie (2011) argue that the decline in waivers was simply the result of a decline in violent crime 
by juveniles.    
 There has always been a recognition that some adolescents commit offenses that are so 
serious, that the juvenile court is simply ill-equipped to provide necessary resources and 
punishments (Loughran, Mulvey, Schubert, Chassin, Steinberg, Piquero, Fagan, Cota-Robles, 
Cauffman, & Losoya, 2010).  The Supreme Court has declared that “waiver to adult court is the 
single most serious act the juvenile court can perform…because once waiver of jurisdiction 
occurs, the child loses all protective and rehabilitative possibilities available” (Redding, 2003, p. 
129).  Before a juvenile is waived, there are several factors that should be considered.   
 The question of whether a juvenile should be prosecuted in adult court is widely debated.   
This paper will examine reasons for and against transfer of juveniles.  Every state acknowledges 
that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults (Griffin, 2008).  In several opinions 
involving juvenile crime, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged that juveniles are different 
and should be treated as such.  Because waiver is so serious, they have required juvenile courts 
to consider six factors before making waiver decisions.  These include (1) age and background of 
the juvenile, (2) nature of the offense, (3) extent and nature of juvenile’s prior record, (4) 
juveniles present intellectual development and psychological maturity, (5) the nature of past 
treatment efforts, and (6) the availability of programs to rehabilitate offenders.  
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
 The purpose of the study will be to examine trends in juvenile crime and present 
criminological theories that explain delinquency.    Bryan-Hancock and Casey (2010) explain 
that many assume if a juvenile commits a crime adult in nature, they are functioning at an adult 
level and should be treated as such.  This is one of the main arguments for transfer.  The study 
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will examine this theory as well as the theory that some juveniles are beyond rehabilitative 
efforts.   
 The study will also briefly examine the types and the appropriateness of current transfer 
laws in many states and if they comply with requirements of Kent v. United States.  It will also 
determine if transfer is being used fairly and equitably.   Waiver thresh holds in many states are 
quite low.  Some states do not require a hearing before a Judge where the appropriateness of 
transfer is examined.  In Alaska, Kansas, and Washington states, prosecutors can seek to waive 
any juvenile delinquency case to criminal court (Griffin et al., 2008, p. 2).  This study will look 
at disparity in transfer laws.  Griffin et al. (2008) found that a majority of juveniles were more 
likely than their adult counterparts to be male and Black.  Kirkish, Sreenvisan, Welsh, Van Gorp, 
Eth, Shopto and Ling (2000) studied juveniles in one California prison and discovered that 62% 
were Hispanic, a high number compared to their adult counterparts. 
When crime, particularly crime committed by juveniles, is perceived to be a problem, 
there is a public outcry for solutions.  A common solution to crime is harsher punishments.  In 
response to growing juvenile crime, many states rewrote or expanded their transfer laws.  An 
argument commonly heard in support of tougher laws is harsh penalties deter crime.  Statistics 
show that prosecuting juveniles as adults does not deter youth from crime. Flesch (2004) reports 
that many juveniles commit crimes within two years of their release from adult prisons.  Fifty-
eight percent of juveniles will commit new crimes compared to only 42% of juveniles who 
remain in the juvenile system.  Juveniles sentenced to prison miss out on opportunities for 
education, counseling, and substance abuse treatment.     
 Proponents of waiver argue that trying a juvenile as an adult is a solution for juveniles 
who have exhausted rehabilitative efforts in the juvenile system.  Flesch (2004) argues that many 
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of the youth waived are in fact first time violent offenders.   These offenders have never received 
the benefit of rehabilitative efforts. Judging rehabilitative amenability cannot be judged on one 
offense.  A juvenile who commits a violent offense is likely to commit only one such offense and 
can benefit from the rehabilitative setting of a juvenile correctional facility (Flesch, 2004, p. 6 ) 
As Kirkish (2000) explains, there are many factors associated with juvenile violence.  Among 
these are ineffective parenting, parental alcoholism, disrupted parental bonding, chaotic family 
style, and presence of personality disorders.   
  Studies of juvenile development show that the maturity emotional functioning of 
juveniles is well below the level of adults.  Bryan-Hancock and Casey (2010) describe 
adolescents as displaying impulsivity and having an absence of complex consideration in 
decision making.  In addition, juveniles do not possess the same psychosocial maturity of adults.  
Psychosocial maturity is measured by (1) responsibility, including self-reliance, (2) perspective, 
including the ability to take the point of view of others, and (3) temperance, which looks to the 
ability to limit impulsivity (Bryan-Hancock & Casey, 2010, p. 58).  These are just some of the 
factors to consider when deciding if it appropriate to prosecute a juvenile as an adult. 
 The study specifically will examine waivers in Utah and Wisconsin, two States 
specifically chosen as study sites by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  
The State of Utah has an automatic transfer statute but relies primarily on judicial waiver.  From 
1988 to 1995, only 225 youth were waived to criminal court (Snyder, Sickmund,& Poe-
Yamagata, 2000, p. 18).  By contrast, Wisconsin lowered their age of original jurisdiction of 
criminal court to age 17, shifting an entire group of youth to the adult system, despite prior 
delinquency history and seriousness of current charges (Torbert, Griffin, Hurst, & MacKenzie, 
2000, p. 7).   
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 This paper will provide an understanding of current juvenile transfer laws, particularly 
current laws in Utah and Wisconsin.  It can be used as an educational tool for individuals who 
work in the juvenile justice system to understand the history of the juvenile waiver, the reasons 
for current policy, and the problems with current laws. This paper will highlight problems in the 
current system and can serve as a tool for prosecutors and law makers in deciding future juvenile 
transfer laws.  
Limitations of the Study 
 Statistics from individual states tracking juvenile crime and waiver is fragmentary and 
incomplete (Griffin, 2008).  Data is submitted to the National Juvenile Court Data Archive which 
makes it possible to form an estimate of cases that are waived, including offenses and 
demographics.  However, the number of cases referred to criminal court by statutory exclusion or 
prosecutorial discretion is hard to track.  Many states to not track and report this kind of detailed 
information.  Griffin (2008) estimates that complete information on the number of youth 
transferred to adult court is available for only 17 states.  This lack of information study limits any 
future and current studies of the issue.   











II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Early History of Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Waiver Laws 
 In the early days of the criminal justice system, children were prosecuted and 
incarcerated with along with adults (Steward-Lindsey, 2006).  Social groups, concerned for the 
welfare of children, advocated the belief that young offenders simply were in need of 
individualized treatment and rehabilitation (Steiner & Wright, 2006).   In 1824, the New York 
Legislature gave authority to the criminal courts to sentence youth under the age of sixteen to the 
House of Refuge (Flesch, 2004).  Following New York’s example, several homes for delinquent 
children were established with the main goal of educating and treating troubled youth (Steward-
Lindsey, 2006).    
In 1899 using the concept of parens patriae (the state as parent), Illinois became the first 
state to create a court specifically for juveniles.  In addition to the goals of protecting the 
community from crime and deterring future violations, the philosophy of the new court was one 
devoted to treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.  This was a direct contrast to the 
philosophy of the adult criminal court, whose goal was the punishment of the offender (Flesch, 
2004).  By 1925, a majority of states had enacted their own juvenile court system (Steward-
Lindsey, 2006). 
 Since the beginning of the juvenile court, judges have had the option of relinquishing 
jurisdiction of certain offenders to criminal courts, although this option was traditional reserved 
for the worst of the worst offenders (Pagnanelli, 2007; Griffin, Addie, Adams, & Firestone, 
2011).   Other types of transfer mechanisms were rare.  This would slowly change.  By 1969, 
only two-thirds of states had laws governing judicial waivers; only three states had laws 
specifically excluding certain classes of crimes from the juvenile court, and only two states 
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granted discretion to the prosecutor in filing decisions (Griffin, 2008).  However, starting in the 
1970s, many states would begin to make changes to how they handled waivers. 
 During the 1970s and early 1980s, many states began to expand traditional waiver laws.  
By 1983, a majority of states had enacted judicial waiver laws, twenty states passed exclusionary 
laws, and nine states granted more discretion to the prosecutor (Griffin, 2008).  During the mid-
1980s and 1990s, the United States saw a surge in violent crime committed by juveniles (see 
Figure 1 and Figure 2).  During the 1990s, there was a 75% increase in violence crime 
committed by juveniles (Flesch, 2004, p. 585).    Pagnanelli (2007) explains that violent crime 
became a frequent topic of conversation in the media.  This in turn promoted a negative image of 
the juvenile justice system.  Members of the public felt that enough was not being done to protect 
society from dangerous youthful offenders.  It became a common belief for juvenile offenders 
that “if you are old enough to do the crime, you are old enough to do the time (Singer, 2011, p. 
271). 
 
Figure 1. Juvenile Violence Crime Index 1980-2008 (Adams & Addie, 2011).
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Figure 2.  Forecast of Teen Homicides 1976-2005 (Adams & Addie, 2011) 
 
 By 1999, every state in the nation and the federal government had made significant 
changes to their waiver laws.  The federal government passed the Violence Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1995 allowing the federal government to criminally prosecute any 
youth over the age of 13 who commits a violent crime with a firearm on federal property 
(Redding, 1999). The bill’s sponsor, Representative Bill McCollum believed that “serious 
juvenile offenders should be thrown in jail, the key should be thrown away and there should be 
very little or no effort to rehabilitate them” (Redding, 1999, p. 92).   The consensus among many 
law makers was that (1) juvenile offenders were responsible for their actions and needed to be 
punished, (2) many juveniles were beyond rehabilitation, (3) rehabilitation does not work, (4) 
waiver would deter future crime, and (5) violent juveniles should remain incarcerated into 
adulthood (Redding, 1999). 
Types of Juvenile Waiver 
 Juvenile waivers can be classified into three categories: (1) legislative waiver, (2) 
prosecutorial waiver, and (3) judicial waiver.    
  Legislative, also known as statutory exclusion laws, grant criminal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction of certain classes of crimes (Griffin, 2008).  In response to rising fears about juvenile 
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crime, during the 1990s, a majority of state legislatures passed new laws mandating that certain 
crimes were excluded from the jurisdiction of juvenile court and automatically sent to criminal 
court (Pagnanelli, 2007).  When a juvenile is automatically transferred to adult court by statute, 
in most cases they are unable to challenge the waiver.  The transfer cannot be reviewed by a 
juvenile court judge (Flesch, 2004).  Legislative, or statutory exclusion laws, work with an 
age/offense formula.  For example, in some states if a juvenile commits murder and is 14 years 
of age, they will automatically be tried as an adult.  Other violent crimes commonly covered 
under legislative waiver include rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault.  As Flesch (2004) 
suggests, legislative waivers assume that juveniles of a certain age who commit violent crimes 
are not amenable to rehabilitation, regardless of prior record or previous rehabilitation efforts. 
Prosecutorial, concurrent jurisdiction, or direct file laws give prosecuting attorneys the 
discretion to determine whether to prosecute a juvenile as an adult, or keep the case in juvenile 
court (Adams & Addie, 2011).  No hearing is held and in some states and the decision of a 
prosecutor cannot be appealed (Flesch, 2004).  Prosecutorial waivers are the least used because 
they are somewhat controversial (Pagnanelli, 2007).   
Concurrent jurisdiction or direct file laws give the prosecutor the broadest of discretion.  
This power can be abused.  A prosecutor can be influenced by a political agenda or personal bias 
rather than the best interests of the juvenile (Flesch, 2004).  Prosecutors often request waiver in 
response to public outcry or their own outrage over the crime (Lockwood, 1992). As Steiner & 
Wright (2006) explain, direct file laws give a prosecutor discretion to keep a child in juvenile 
court; however they are likely to put the state’s interests above the child.   A prosecutor’s racial 
bias can also influence transfer decisions.  Flesch (2004) reported the findings of a Texas study 
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that found that prosecutors were more likely to transfer Black and Hispanic offenders to adult 
court than White offenders.   
The third type of waiver, the judicial waiver, is the most common (Flesch, 2004).  
Judicial waivers give authority to the juvenile court judge to remove a youth from their 
jurisdiction and transfer them to the adult court (Adams & Addie, 2011).   Lockwood (1999) 
argues that juvenile court judges are in the best position to decide waiver. When making transfer 
decisions, judges, rather than prosecutors and legislators, have the ability to focus on the 
characteristics of the offender, rather than the nature of the crime.   The juvenile court has the 
dual purpose of protecting public interests and the best interest of the child.  To balance their 
goals, the juvenile court has the responsibility to see that serious juvenile offenders are held 
accountable, while seeing these offenders receive individual treatment and opportunities for 
rehabilitation.     
 Flesch (2004) argues that despite the criteria set forth in Kent, many judges primarily 
consider only two factors, the dangerousness of the offender and the amenability to 
rehabilitation.  Flesch (2004) also argues that having too much discretion may result in judges 
unequally applying waiver criteria to youth who appear before them.   Judges, like prosecutors, 
may also be subject to political pressure to transfer juveniles to adult court.  McCall (2011) 
reported the findings of a 2004 study which found evidence that elected judges in Pennsylvania 
were more punitive when reelection time came closer.  McCall (2011) found that elected judges 
were particularly more punitive towards juveniles after the Columbine High School shooting in 
1999, an incident that further propelled juvenile violence into the national spotlight.  
 In addition to the three types of waivers, many states have enacted other provisions 
(Griffin, 2008).  “Once and adult/always adult” laws state that once a juvenile has been waived 
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to adult court, any subsequent violations of the law will be prosecuted in criminal court, 
regardless of the type of offense.  Reverse waiver laws allow juveniles to petition the criminal 
court to send their cases back to criminal court.  Finally, blending sentencing laws allow juvenile 
courts to use tough criminal penalties as well as allowing the criminal courts to impose juvenile 
dispositions.  
State Transfer Laws 
 Starting in 1990, many states drastically changed existing waiver laws.  Changes included 
lowering the minimum age for transfer, increasing the number of transferable offenses, and 
expanding prosecutorial discretion while reducing judicial discretion (Redding & Fuller, 2004).  
Currently, 45 states have discretionary judicial waiver laws (Griffin, Addie, Adams, & Firestone, 
2011).  Upon the prosecutor’s motion, a Judge will consider several factors and determine if the 
juvenile should be waived.  
Waiver thresholds vary among states, as does the age a juvenile can be transferred (see 
Figure 3).  For example, in Alaska, Kansas, and Washington, a prosecutor can request that any 
juvenile be sent to juvenile court.  Other states have stricter standards.  In discretionary waivers, 
the burden of proving the juvenile should be transferred is placed on the prosecution.  In 15 
states, there is also a presumptive waiver law where the burden is shifted to the juvenile if their 
offense falls under a certain category.  The juvenile must argue to the Judge why waiver is not 





Figure 3. Minimum age juvenile can be transfer to criminal court (Griffin et al. 2011) 
 
Fifteen states also have mandatory waiver laws in which a case is initiated in juvenile 
court, but the court is required to transfer if the case meets certain conditions.  The Judge’s only 
purpose is to validate the waiver (Griffin et al., 2011).  Twenty-nine states have enacted 
legislative or statutory exclusion laws.  Fifteen states give prosecutors the discretion to either file 
in juvenile court or file the case directly with the criminal court.   In 37 states, original 
jurisdiction of the criminal court does not begin until a youth’s 18 birthday, but in ten states, 
jurisdiction of the criminal court begins at age 17.  In three states, original jurisdiction of the 
criminal court begins at age 16 (See Table 1).   In recent years, despite a reduction in juvenile 
crime, few states have made amendments to their transfer laws.  Appendix A is an overview of 




Upper Age of Original Juvenile Court Jurisdiction as of 2007 
















All other states and the District of Columbia 
*Upper age of jurisdiction is being raised from 15 to 17 in 2012 
**Upper age rose from 16 to 17 in 2010. 
Table 1. Upper Age of Original Juvenile Court Jurisdiction (Griffin et al., 2011) 
Significant Supreme Court Decisions 
 The first significant Supreme Court decision affecting the juvenile justice system and 
juvenile waiver was Kent v. United States (Flesch, 2004).    Morris Kent was a juvenile with a 
history of delinquency offenses.  In September 1961, while on probation for theft, 16-year old 
Kent was charged with rape and burglary.  Kent was subsequently arrested and placed in a home 
for children.  Anticipating waiver to criminal court, Kent’s legal counsel immediately filed a 
motion with the juvenile court indicating that he opposed waiver and requested a hearing to 
argue against transfer. Rather, the judge issued an order of transfer without a hearing and without 
any reference to counsel’s motion.  On appeal, the Supreme Court invalidated the waiver and 
held that a juvenile facing waiver to adult court is entitled to a hearing and a statement of the 
rationale of the waiver (Steward-Lindsey, 2006).   
 Prior to Kent, judges could transfer juveniles to adult court without a hearing and without 
specifically stating the reasons why waiver was necessary.  In their decision, the Supreme Court 
held that the decision to transfer was critically important and that juveniles were entitled to 
receive due process and fairness.  The Supreme Court established eight factors that a judge 
should consider in their transfer decisions.  The factors cited by the court are: 
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(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of 
the community requires waiver; (2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an 
aggressive , violent, premeditated or willful manner; (3)…greater weight being given to 
offenses  against persons especially if personal injury resulted; (4) the prosecutive merit 
of the complaint…; (5) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 
court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults…; (6) the 
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, 
environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; (7) the record and 
previous history of the juvenile…; and (8) the prospects for adequate protection  of the 
public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile…by the use of 
procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.  
 
(Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 566-568 as cited by Pagnanelli, 2007). 
 The decision in Kent was later reaffirmed by the Court in Breed v. Jones.  In McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that juveniles were not entitled to jury trials in 
delinquency proceedings.  The Court believed that there should be differences between the 
juvenile courts’ treatment philosophy of rehabilitation versus the criminal court’s punitive nature 
(Flesch, 2004).   In 1980, the Supreme Court vacated the death sentence of a juvenile convicted 
of murder.  In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the court found that “youth is more than a chronological 
fact.  It is a time of life when a person may be the most susceptible to influence and 
psychological damage.  Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, 
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults” (Sarker, 
2007, p. 366).  In Roper v. Simmons (2004), the Supreme Court ruled that it was cruel and 
unusual punishment to sentence a juvenile to death (Sarker, 2007).  
Who is Being Waived? 
 Annually, about 1% of petitioned delinquency cases are transferred to criminal court 
(Adams & Addie, 2011).  Currently, a majority of youth transferred are at least age 16, male, and 
have committed a crime against a person (See Appendix B and Appendix C).  This has not 
always been the case.  From 1989 to 1992, drug cases were more likely to be waived to court 
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than any other offense.  In 1991, 4.2% of drug cases were transferred to adults courts (Adams & 
Addie, 2011).   A majority of youth transferred during this time for drug offenses were Black.  
Redding & Fuller (2004) argue that existing laws transfer laws have disproportionately affect 
minorities.  In 2008, a majority of youth transferred in the State of Florida were Black, while in 
Arizona and California, a majority of transferred youth were Hispanic. 
The purpose of waivers is to divert youth who have exhausted the resources of the 
juvenile court and are no longer amenable to rehabilitation efforts.  Often, this is not the case.  
Flesch (2004) argues that discretionary waivers have resulted in first time violent offenders, or 
offenders with little delinquency history, being transferred to juvenile court.  The easiest way to 
waive a juvenile to adult court is through legislative waivers.  A juvenile with no prior record or 
who committed a non-serious crime could be automatically waived based simply on statute 
(Tang, Nunez, & Bourgeois, 2009).      
General and Specific Deterrence  
 A common argument for transfers is that it (1) deters other juveniles from committing 
serious crimes, and (2) keeps a juvenile from committing future crimes (Redding & Fuller, 
2004). Griffin (2008) reports that most studies have failed to uncover any link between juvenile 
crime rates and adult criminal prosecution.  Schubert, Mulvey, Thomas, Loughran, Fagan, 
Chassin, Piquerro, Losoya, Steinberg, and Cauffman (2010) suggest that evidence instead points 
to the assumption that youth are more likely to reoffend, and to reoffend more quickly and more 
often than those who remain in the juvenile court.   A 1994 study looked at recidivism rates 
amongst juveniles age 14-18 in Idaho from 1976 to 1986.  The State of Idaho changed their 
existing waiver laws in 1981, resulting in more juveniles being prosecuted as adults.  Arrest rates 
in neighboring Montana and Wyoming (that had laws similar to Idaho before 1981) actually 
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decreased while crime in Idaho increased by 13% (Redding, 1999; Steiner & Wright, 2006; 
Redding, 2010). 
  A 1996 Minnesota study reported that transferred juveniles were more likely to recidivate 
than non-transferred juveniles by a rate of 150% (Redding, 1999; Redding, 2003; Pagnanelli, 
2007).  A New York study determined that youthful robbery offenders sentenced in criminal 
court also reoffended at faster and higher rates than retained in juvenile court (Redding, 1999; 
Pagnanelli, 2007). A Florida study compared recidivism rates among juveniles offenders 
transferred to criminal court to non-transferred juveniles.  The study found that rearrest rates for 
transferred juveniles were higher than their counterparts, and time between re-offenses was 
shorter.  A follow up study in Florida six years later affirmed previous findings (Redding, 2003). 
 Some research has suggested that transfer laws may have a general deterrent effect on 
juveniles if they were more aware of the possibility of being prosecuted as an adult (Redding, 
2010).  Redding and Fuller (2004), conducted a study amongst youth prosecuted in the adult 
court in Georgia.  The State of Georgia had conducted an awareness campaign to educate youth 
on juvenile waiver laws.  However, of the 37 youth interviewed, only 8 were aware that being 
tried as an adult was even a possibility.  Those who were aware expected that they would be tried 
as a juvenile and that they would receive only minor punishments from the juvenile court.  Of the 
youth interviewed, 75% stated that if they had known they could be tried and punished in the 
adult system, they likely would not have committed the crime (Redding, 2010). 
Legal Consequences for Juveniles Prosecuted as Adults 
 Legislative reforms have resulted in an increase in the number of minors convicted of 
felonies (Redding, 2003).  In its decision in Kent, the Supreme Court found that transfer can have 
tremendous consequences for a juvenile (Redding, 1999).  Specifically, if a juvenile is convicted 
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of a felony in criminal court, they risk the loss of several rights and privileges.  These 
consequences could include the following:  lose the right to vote; lose the right to serve in 
military; lose the right to own a firearm; the conviction becomes public record; the conviction 
must be reported to potential employers; the conviction is considered in sentencing for future 
crimes and sentencing under three-strikes laws; and possible incarceration in adult prison 
(Redding, 1999, p. 93-94). 
Other Issues for Juveniles in the Adult System 
 Juveniles transferred to the adult system face other unique challenges.  Juveniles 
prosecuted as adults are entitled to the same constitutional protections as adults, including the 
right to a jury.  Some scholars have conducted studies to determine if jurors treated youth any 
differently than they would an adult facing similar charges.  Levine, Williams, Sixt, & Valenti 
(2001) discovered that jurors could potentially show some bias against a juvenile, simply for the 
fact they were facing charges in criminal court.  Using a panel of mock jurors, the authors found 
that without knowing anything about a previous history, jurors would be most likely to infer a 
juvenile had past criminal history, simply for the reason that they were being charged as an adult.  
As a result, these jurors would be more likely to believe in the guilt of the juvenile.   
 Another study looked into juror bias against juveniles if they had a history of child abuse.  
Najdowski, Bottoms, and Vargas (2009) report that 51% of adjudicated adolescents are victims 
of child abuse.  Mock jurors in the authors study only considered abuse as a mitigating factor if 
the youth was accused of murdering their abuser.  In other cases, mock jurors used abuse history 
as an aggravating factor in their decision of guilt.  These jurors believed being a victim made 
them less amenable to rehabilitation.  Najdowski et al. (2009) suggest the mock  jurors saw the 
abused offenders as damaged goods, more likely to reoffend. 
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Some studies have shown that youth offenders in criminal courts received harsher 
penalties than both their counterparts in the adults system, as well as youth who remain in the 
juvenile system (Redding, 2003; Steiner, 2009; Jordan & Freiburger, 2010, Kurlycheck & 
Johnson, 2010).   Kurlycheck & Johnson (2010) report a 2004 study that found that sentences for 
minors sentenced in criminal court in Pennsylvania were 80% more severe than similar 
defendants ages 18-20.    Racial disparity is also present in juvenile sentences. Jordan and 
Frieburger (2010) discovered that Black youth are more likely to be sentenced to both prison and 
jail than White Youth.  They also discovered that Hispanic youth were also more likely to be 
sentenced to prison their White peers.  An interesting phenomenon in their study revealed that 
prior contact with the juvenile system increased the likelihood of prison for Blacks, but reduced 
the likelihood for Whites.   
 Judges in adult criminal courts have less discretion in sentencing than judges in the 
juvenile system (Johnson & Kurlychek, 2012).  During the period of reform of juvenile waiver 
laws, many legislatures introduced sentencing guidelines to the criminal court.  Sentencing 
guidelines attempt to standardize sentences based on seriousness of the offense and prior record 
of the defendant.  Sentencing guidelines limit the judge’s ability to individualize punishments 
based on offenders, rather than offense.  Judges in the juvenile system have more discretion in 
sentencing and punishments are more individualized and tend to be less severe.  When using 
sentencing guidelines, some argue that juvenile status should be used as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.  Because they are less culpable and less responsible for their actions, they should 
receive less punishment.  Instead, youth is often used as an aggravating factor because judges 
have no formal basis to judge future offending (Kurlycheck & Johnson, 2010). 
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 The number of juveniles sentenced to prison rose 218% from 1983 to 1998 (Johnson & 
Kurlychek, 2012).  Juveniles sentenced to the adult prison system face unique challenges.  
Redding (2003) reported a 1997 study that found that juveniles in prison were eight times more 
likely to commit suicide.  The same study also found that youth in prison were five times more 
likely to be sexually assaulted, and almost twice as likely to be attacked with a weapon by fellow 
inmates.    In prison, youth are exposed to the adult criminal culture.  Youth become socialized 
and adapt their behavior to fit it.  Many youth soon accept violence as a daily part of life, and 
become violent themselves in order to fit in.  As one youth stated “being a kid is to be suspected 








III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 A review of the literature to this point has examined past and current state laws in 
juvenile delinquency and transfer to adult court.  The review has also examined reasons for and 
against juvenile transfer.  It is also important to examine the reasons for juvenile delinquency.   
Understanding theoretical perspectives into juvenile behavior and delinquency can assist in 
examining whether juvenile transfer to adult court is proper.   
For many years, countless researchers have looked for any number of factors that explain 
juvenile delinquency.  Early criminologists focused on biological traits, while modern day 
criminologists have been more focused on examining environmental and social factors.  Clifford 
Shaw and Henry Mackay believed juvenile delinquency was a product of the urban environment.  
Edwin Sutherland, Donald Cressey, and Ronald Akers theorized that criminal behavior is a 
learned behavior (Cullen & Agnew, 2006).  Dozens of theories could be discussed to explain 
juvenile delinquency and why the juvenile system is the best venue to handle youth.  This paper 
will focus on three theories: life course development and psychosocial maturity; labeling theory; 
and social bonds theory. 
Life Course Development Theory/Psychosocial Maturity 
 Moffit (1993) presented the theory of life course development.   This theory examines 
individuals who commit deviant and antisocial behavior throughout their lifetime and those 
whose behaviors are short-term.  Moffit (1993) suggests that only a small group of individuals 
engage in antisocial behavior through their life.  In contrast a larger group will limit their 
behaviors to their adolescent years.  Moffit refers to these groups individuals as life course 




Figure 4. Illustration of Life Course Development (Moffit, 1993) 
 
According to Moffit (1993), one-third of males will be arrested during their lifetime for a 
serious criminal offense.  Approximately four-fifths of males will commit at least a minor 
criminal infraction.  Flesch (2004) reports that 90% to 93% of males will commit at least some 
kind of delinquent act.  Bryan-Hancock and Casey (2010) believe it is both normal and common 
for a juvenile to be involved in one or two delinquent acts as they grow and mature.  As Moffit 
(1993) explains, a majority of these males will begin committing delinquent offenses during their 
adolescent years, starting at the onset of puberty and continuing anti-social behavior throughout 
their adolescent development.  By the time a male reaches their mid-20s, three-fourths of 
delinquents will cease their offending behaviors.  Flesch (2004) cites statistics that indicates most 
delinquent behavior peaks at age 16, and then starts to decline. Kruh, Frick, and Clements (2000) 




 Several scholars have studied why delinquent behavior decreases as juveniles age into 
adulthood.  Moffit (1993) theorizes that a majority of juvenile offenders engage in antisocial 
behavior when they perceive the outcome to be profitable for them.  Juveniles are less able 
evaluate long term consequences.  Moffit also reports that juvenile offenders also engage in 
antisocial behavior to mimic the behavior of peers they wish to gain acceptance from.  Pagnanelli 
(2007) theorizes that youth have an immaturity level and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, are more vulnerable and susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
and have characters that are not as formed as adults.  Kurlycheck & Johnson (2010) state that 
young violators are less culpable and deserve less punishment, no matter the venue simply for 
the fact they are less responsible for their actions.  Young violators have yet to develop full 
moral capability to judge right from wrong. 
 Bryan-Hancock and Casey (2010) present their theory of juvenile delinquency with the 
concept of psychosocial maturity.  Psychosocial maturity is defined as the general level of 
individual’s socio-emotional competence and adaptive functioning (Bryan-Hancock & Casey, 
2010, p. 58).  A person’s psychosocial maturity is made up of three factors: responsibility, 
including self-reliance and independence; perspective and the ability to analyze decisions in a 
broader context; and the ability to limit impulsiveness and the level of evaluation of a situation 
before an action.  The authors explain that adolescents are impulsive and lack complex 
consideration in decision making, which can result in dangerous situations.  Further, juveniles 
under the age of 18 are less likely to apply relevant information to situations and process events 
in a much less meaningful way than young adults ages 18-14.   
 Bryan-Hancock and Casey (2010) report on the results of several studies to support their 
theory.  A 2000 study found that adolescents did not appear to be stabilized in their judgments 
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and psychosocial maturity until the age of 21.  A 2005 study found that young people between 
the ages of 16 and 19 lacked the ability to function at adult levels of maturity.    Juveniles may 
understand that their behavior is wrong; they simply lack the inability to consider long-term 
consequences for their actions.   
 Bryan-Hancock and Casey (2010) specifically studied the psychosocial maturity of three 
groups.  Those under the age of 18, participants age 18, and participants age 25.  Results showed 
that the psychosocial maturity of the group under the age of 18 differed significantly than that of 
the participants who were age 25.  The 25-year-old group was better able to accept responsibility 
for their actions, consider future consequences, consider the perspective of others, and suppress 
aggressive behaviors.  There was less of a marked difference between the 18-year-old group and 
the 25-year-old group.  However, results clearly indicated that young people are not functioning 
at the same psychological maturity level as their adult peers (Bryan-Hancock & Casey, 2010, p. 
66). 
Labeling Theory 
 According to labeling theory, deviant behavior will continue and possibly intensify when 
negative labels are attached to offenders (Matsueda, 2000).  Negative labels stigmatize 
individuals, lowers self-esteem, and isolates individuals from conventional society.  According to 
Matsueda (2000), deviant labels are more likely to be applied to members of disadvantaged 
classes, ethnic minorities, and other groups stereotyped as deviant or criminal.  These are groups 
considered high-risk for delinquent behaviors. 
 Youth form their identity by associating with families, peer groups, and the community.  
As Matsueda (2000) further explains, if an adult labels a youth as a “bad kid”, they may begin to 
see themselves that way and adopt the bad kid persona.   A youth may commit small delinquent 
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acts such as breaking windows, climbing on roofs, and shoplifting, believing these acts to be 
play, fun, or adventure.  Society however, labels these as acts as evil, nuisance, and delinquency.  
Repeated conduct by the youth soon causes polarization in the community.  The community 
perspective changes by no longer considering the acts as evil, but instead labeling the offender as 
evil.  In response, the youth adopts a delinquent self-identify and further integrates himself into 
the delinquent culture.  The more a youth is arrested, the more the labeling process is intensified. 
 Society’s response to youth misbehavior can make delinquency worse.  Kirkish et al. 
(2000) blames the national shift from rehabilitation of delinquents to punishment.  Pagnanelli  
(2007) argues that the transfer process contributes to the labeling process.   Transferring youth to 
criminal court can have a significant negative effect on development.   As Pagnanelli  (2007) 
explains, a juvenile who is tried in criminal court feels unjustly treated, and juveniles with a 
negative perception are more likely to adopt a delinquent self-concept which in turn will cause 
them to re-offend. 
 Jordan and Frieburg (2010) rationalize that the juvenile justice system was created to 
protect adolescents from the stigma of the adult criminal justice system.  With tougher transfer 
laws, there has been an ideological shift to the idea that society needs to be tough on juvenile 
delinquency.  Johnson and Kurlycheck (2012) state that transfer to adult court sends a message to 
youth that they are unsuitable for the protections of the juvenile justice system, and that they are 
so incorrigible or morally reprehensible that they are beyond forgiveness and leniency.   
 Redding (2003) interviewed youth who had been transferred to the adult system.  Most 
saw the process not so much a condemnation of their behavior, but a condemnation of them as a 
person.  These youth gained the impression that they were being punished not because their 
behavior was bad, but that they were bad.  Unlike their treatment in criminal court, these youth 
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believed that the juvenile court communicated to them they retained some worth in society.  
Redding (2003) found that juveniles generally perceived juvenile court punishments as fair and 
helpful whereas the criminal court only wanted to punish them.  These juveniles were angry and 
resentful.  If a juvenile perceives their sentence as unfair, they are more likely to adopt a criminal 
self-concept.  Redding (2010) further elaborates that stigmatization and labeling a juvenile as a 
convicted felon also results in higher recidivism. 
Social Bond Theory 
 Hirschi’s (1969) social bond theory suggests that delinquency and a youth’s social bonds 
are inversely related.  Hirschi contends that someone is less likely to engage in delinquency if 
they have strong bonds to family, community, and society. The stronger the attachments, the less 
likely a person would be to commit crimes.  Social bond theory has four elements: attachment, 
commitment, involvement, and belief.  The first element suggests that psychopathy and deviant 
behavior is the result of a lack of attachment to others.  When a youth has an emotional 
connection to another person, they are more likely to care what the other person things of them.  
If the opportunity for delinquency presents itself, the youth will be concerned about 
disappointing their attachments.  Parents represent the most important attachment a child can 
have.  As children grow into teens and parents have less of a physical presence, if attachment is 
positive, parents will remain psychologically present. 
 Hirschi (1969) next explains the role of commitment.  Youth who are less likely to 
engage in delinquent acts display a commitment to conforming to society’s standards.  Youth 
with strong commitment do well in school and have bright prospects for the future.  Youth with 
weak commitment have little to no stake in conformity. They struggle in school and have little 
hope or incentive for the future.  The third element is involvement.  The more a youth engages in 
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wholesome, conventional activities, the less time they are idle.  Idleness and boredom can result 
in deviant behaviors.  The last element is belief.   Simply stated, if a young person believes they 
should obey the rules of society, the less likely he or he will violate those rules. 
 Kirkish et al. (2000) explain that many delinquent youth share common risk factors.  
Juvenile delinquents possess weak familial bonds. Many come from homes with ineffective 
parents, parental alcoholism, and disrupted parental bonds.  A majority of delinquent youth are 
victims of childhood abuse and neglect.  Pagnanelli (2007) states that family is the major 
socializing agent that influences and helps shape a child’s attitude, values, behavior, and 
personality. When youth lack strong familial bonds, many will seek to form attachments 
elsewhere finding themselves in a violent culture of gangs.  Delinquent youth also have low 
commitment.  Najdowski et al. (20nt09) reports that many juveniles in the legal system are more 
likely to be intellectually disabled than their non-delinquent peers.  The average offender has an 
IQ that is one standard deviation below youth who are not involved in the system.   These youth 
struggle in school reducing their commitment. 
 As Pagnanelli  (2007) points out, the juvenile justice system can improve the social bonds 
of at-risk youth.  The juvenile court has many positive characteristics that assist youth in their 
rehabilitation.  Judges, practitioners, probation officers, and caseworkers all work together and 
form relationships with delinquent youth.  These positive attachments are often lacking in the 
adult system.  Redding (2003) reports that practitioners in the criminal justice system are ill-
equipped to deal with the special circumstances of young people.  In particular, prison staff are 
not trained to counsel, educate, or simply provide basic case management in juvenile cases.  In 
addition, as part of adjudication,  the juvenile court system can refer youth to positive, pro-social 
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programs and activities to create and/or strengthen community bonds.  These programs are not as 
available to youth in the criminal system. 
Discussion of Theories 
 
 Each of the three theories discussed can assist in explaining why some kids choose to 
participate in delinquent acts.  Statistics show that many youth will participate in at least one 
delinquent act before their eighteenth birthday.  Some acts are minor, while a number of acts are 
serious in nature.  Statistics also show that for a number of these youth, their offending will peak 
at the age of 16.  By the age of 25, a number of youth will cease all offending behaviors.  
Transfer to the adult system is meant to deter future crime.  A review of the literature revealed 
that youth transferred to adult court are at a higher risk to recidivate than youth who remain in 
juvenile court.  If a juvenile delinquent is kept in the juvenile court, life course development 
theory believes that these many of these youth may reduce or even cease their behaviors as they 
grow and mature.   
The psychosocial maturity level of minors is not on the same level as adults.  Youth are 
impulsive and they lack the ability to make decisions based on long term consequences.  
However, youth who are transferred to the adult system are treated and punished on the same 
level as adults.  The juvenile court system was originally created because officials recognized the 
difference between adults and children, and they believed children were deserving of leniency.   
Juvenile court officials receive specific training on how to deal with juvenile offenders.  In 
juvenile court, delinquents still receive consequences while participating in rehabilitative 
programs to improve their psychosocial maturity level. 
Labeling a child as a delinquent can also have negative consequences.  Youth interviewed 
by Redding (2003) felt that the adult system made them feel as if they were of less worth, while 
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they felt that the juvenile court cared about their well-being.  There are also other benefits for a 
youth who remains in juvenile court. Review of the literature revealed that there were legal 
consequences for a youth who are convicted of a felony in adult court.  Unlike the juvenile court, 
the conviction becomes public record.   Any convictions must be reported on employment 
applications.  Employers are less likely to hire someone who has been convicted of a felony.  
Redding (1999) points out that the consequences can increase recidivism as opportunities in life 
are limited when someone is labeled a criminal.  When a youth remains in juvenile court, their 
adjudications are not considered a criminal conviction. 
Finally, it has been shown how important strong social bonds are in preventing juvenile 
delinquency. A typical juvenile offender lacks strong bonds to family and community.  Many 
come from single parent homes.  Many are abused and/or neglected.   The juvenile court is in the 
best position to assist youth in strengthening their bonds by developing programs for troubled 
youth.  A Judge in the Third District Juvenile Court in Utah started The Village Project in 1994 
(Utah State Courts, 2012).  The program matches troubled youth with community mentors.  
Mentors work with youth by helping them with school work, teaching them new skills and 
hobbies, participating in activities, and just by being a positive role model in their life. This is 
just one example of hundreds of programs in the country to assist at-risk-youth. Youth who are 
transferred to adult court do not have access to special programs aimed at increasing their bonds 




SECTION IV: STATE CASE STUDIES 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, 46 states made significant changes to their Juvenile Justice 
Codes.  Utah and Wisconsin are both states with lower crime rates, yet both were concerned 
about juvenile crime and were among states to make changes.  Both responded in different ways.   
Utah was one of the first states to make significant changes in 1987, allowing any juvenile age 
14 and over charged with a felony to be waived.  In 1996, Wisconsin removed all 17-year-olds 
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court regardless of their charge and prior record.   
Wisconsin 
 The State of Wisconsin allows for two types of waivers: discretionary juvenile waiver 
and statutory exclusion laws.  Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code sec. 938.18 allows for 
prosecutors to petition to waive juveniles age 14 and older to adult criminal court when accused 
of one of the following criminal acts: felony murder, second-degree reckless homicide, sexual 
assault, taking hostages, kidnapping, using a dangerous weapon or explosive in the commission 
of a burglary or assault, robbery of a financial institution, and manufacturing, distributing, or 
delivering a controlled substance.  In addition, a prosecutor can also request a juvenile age 14 or 
older be waived to adult court when committing a felony for the benefit of a criminal gang (Wis. 
Stat. Ann., sec. 938.18(1)(b)).   A prosecutor, upon the filing of a petition, can request that any 





Year Petitions Filed Youth Waived 
2003 14,206 323 
2004 13,182 370 
2005 13,305 377 
2006 12,489 303 
2007 11,688 281 
2008 11,060 194 
2009 9,324 167 
2010 8,366 173 
Table 2.   Youth Waived in Wisconsin, 2003-2010 (Mendell, 2011) 
 The Wisconsin State Legislature has established statute specifically granting criminal 
court exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles ages 10 and older when charged with the following: 
committing assault or battery while placed in a juvenile correctional facility or residential care 
center, first degree intentional homicide, attempted first degree intentional homicide, first degree 
reckless homicide, and second degree intentional homicide (Wis. Stat. Ann., sec. 938.183(1).  
The State of Wisconsin also has once-an-adult always-an-adult laws.  Once a juvenile has been 
convicted of any violation in criminal court, any subsequent violations will be prosecuted in 
criminal court.   
 Effective January 1, 1996, the state of Wisconsin enacted significant changes to their 
Juvenile Justice Code.  Section 938.12(1) granted the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over 
juveniles over the age of 10.  Previous law granted the court jurisdiction over juveniles as young 
as 12.  Section 938.02(1) was amended as follows:   
“Adult” means a person who is 18 years of age or older, except that for purposes of 
investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated any state or federal 
criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance, “adult” means a person who has 
attained 17 years of age.  
 
With this amendment, Wisconsin joined 11 other states to exclude youth younger than 18 from 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Torbet, Griffin, Hurst, & MacKenzie, 2000).  In 2008, 
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lawmakers proposed returning jurisdiction of 17-year-olds back to the juvenile court.  The 
measure failed to pass (Boggs, Campbell, Martin & Wolf, 2008). 
 Removing an entire age group from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is considered the 
broadest form of statutory exclusion (Torbert et al., 2000).   At the time of the reform, it was 
estimated that 17-year-olds were responsible for approximately 25% of violent crime, and 15% 
of property crime.  By automatically removing this age group from the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, Wisconsin reduced the number of youth in the system by 12%.  Lawmakers 
believed this change was necessary, citing three main concerns. 
 First, law makers believed it was necessary to promote individual accountability.  A 
study of the juvenile system classified Wisconsin’s courts as revolving doors.  The report 
recommended that 17-year-olds were mature enough to be held to a greater accountability with 
the full range of adult dispositions.  The study also reported the belief that the criminal justice 
system was in a better position to enforce accountability through incarceration in prisons and 
jails.  In addition, law makers felt that adult probation and parole agents were better equipped at 
enforcing sanctions than officials in the juvenile justice system. 
 Second, the change was enacted to bring jurisdiction in line with neighboring states.  
Illinois and Michigan had established the age of original jurisdiction at 16.
1
   Officials were 
concerned that criminals, in particular sophisticated criminals from neighboring Chicago, would 
use older juveniles to expand drug markets in southern Wisconsin (Torbert et al., 2000, p. 8).   
And third, law makers felt that by removing 17-year-olds from juvenile court, already limited 
resources would be freed up for the rehabilitation of younger offenders. 
 When the amendments to the Juvenile Justice Court were enacted, the state of Wisconsin 
felt both immediate and long term impacts (Torbert et al., 2000).  Juvenile courts experienced a 
                                                 
1
 Illinois has since raised the age of original jurisdiction to 17. 
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decrease in referrals. Milwaukee County along saw a 25% decrease from 1995 to 1997.  
Admissions in juvenile correctional institutions decreased by 15% between 1995 and 1997.  
However, by 2000, the population had risen to prereform levels. While juvenile correctional 
centers saw a decrease in population, already crowded adult correctional centers experienced 
increased workloads.  Jail admissions between 1996 and 1997 increased by 10% while prison 
admissions increased 36%.  
 Placing minors into adult correctional facilities came with a new set of challenges for 
officials (Torbert et al., 2000).  Under current Wisconsin law, with the exception of criminal 
responsibility, 17-year-olds are not considered as adults.  They cannot vote, make legal 
decisions, or obtain medical treatment without the consent of parents.   In 1995, the Wisconsin 
legislature gave power to correctional officials to provide medical care to minors.  However, 
many jailors have expressed concern and still try and obtain parental consent before providing 
any medical care to an inmate who has not yet turned 18. 
 In Wisconsin, 17-year-olds are still subject to educational requirements (Torbet et al, 
2000).  After 1996, jails and prisons were required to work with local school district and add 
classrooms so youth could continue with their education.  A study found that this has been a 
positive addition to jails.  Inmates up to age 21 were also given access to classrooms.  Older 
inmates often encouraged younger inmates to participate in school and graduate.  Offering 
educational opportunities also contributed to the overall safety and security in jails.  Teachers 
however have struggled to teach inmates who already function at grade levels below other high 
school students.  Many of the inmates lack necessary high school credits, so planning a 
curriculum to benefit the students has also been difficult.    
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 A study conducted by Torbet et al. (2000) found other issues with Wisconsin’s reforms.  
Prior to the changes in legislation, only the most serious, violent, and chronic offenders were 
transferred into the adult system.  Seventeen-year-old offenders with minor violations were kept 
within the juvenile system where charges could be handled informally.    After the reform, all 17-
year-olds were subject to prosecution in criminal court. Mendell (2011) reports than since 1996, 
approximately 250,000 of 17-year-olds have been arrested for non-violent offenses.  Only 5% of 
17-year-olds are charged with serious or violent offenses.    One of the counties in the studied 
lacked resources to operate a diversion program for young offenders.  In another, staff was 
untrained in how to work with youth and found difficulty in tailoring programs to meet their 
special needs.   
 Urbina (2005) interviewed practitioners in the Wisconsin Criminal Justice System to 
understand their views on prosecuting juveniles in criminal court.  Public defenders in Wisconsin 
reported that in their view the primary objectives of juvenile waiver were meant to be (1) severe 
punishment, (2) deterrence, (3) public safety, and (4) retribution.   When questioned about 
convictions and sentences, public defenders reported that being waived to adult court did not 
increase the probability of conviction, however is did increase the probability of receiving a 
longer or harsher sentence.    
 Public defenders were then asked what they felt were the benefits of juvenile waivers.  A 
majority reported that first, adult court allowed for longer sentences for violent juveniles charged 
with extremely serious offenses.  Second, juveniles were granted additional constitutional rights, 
such as jury trials, that they would not be guaranteed in juvenile court.  Third, the criminal court 
was in a better position to impose swifter and harsher consequences for non-compliance.  Fourth, 
some treatment programs were more accessible in adult facilities.  Fifth, the adult system was 
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better able to implement restitution.  Sixth, sending the most violent offenders to adult court 
freed up additional resources for younger juveniles.  And last, waivers were a positive social 
control mechanism (Urbina, 2005, pp. 156-157). 
 The public defenders in Wisconsin also reported problems with the current waiver 
system.  By automatically sending all 17-year-olds to criminal court, each juvenile is unable to 
be judged individually.  Some public defenders have also seen waivers used as a threat by a 
prosecutor to induce a plea.  Some judges have focused more on an offense than on the 
individual or their psychological maturity.  Some waivers are based more on age than on 
rehabilitative needs.  Some public defenders complain that social workers are not working 
enough with families before recommending waiver.  Public defenders also felt that some waivers 
were politically motivated or done because of a lack of resources in the juvenile system.  Finally, 
many public defenders felt that the criminal justice system was a dumping ground for troubled 
kids that the juvenile court was ill-equipped at dealing with (Urbina, 2005, p. 157).  
 In addition to the problems encountered, public defenders also reported many other 
negatives (Urbina, 2005).    Many juveniles were unable to adequately read or write, had several 
mental health issues, and substance abuse issues.  Juveniles in Wisconsin prisons have little 
access to treatment or educational services.  When they are released, they do not possess the 
necessary skills to function in the adult world.  Many of the juveniles are also ill-equipped to 
deal with the strict conditions of adult probation and parole.  The public defenders also reported 
youth who became discouraged when they realized they were being labeled as youth who could 
not be reformed.  Youth who were sent to institutions became more bitter and anti-social.  The 
public defenders also noticed a great disparity between African American and other minority 
youth who were waived compared to their white counterparts.  
35 
 
 Prosecuting attorneys were also interviewed in Urbina’s (2005) study.  Prosecutors felt 
the primary objectives for waivers were (1) punishment, (2) better treatment options in the adult 
system, and (3) public safety.  Prosecutors in Wisconsin also believe the waivers are a good way 
of sending a message to potential offenders in the community about the consequences of 
committing a crime (Urbina, 2005, p. 160).   Like the public defenders, the prosecutors expressed 
a belief that being waived into adult court did not increase the likelihood of conviction, but did 
increase the probability of a harsher sentence. 
 When asked about benefits of waivers, prosecutor responses differed from public 
defenders (Urbina, 2005).  Prosecutors felt that the benefits were individual accountability, 
public safety, longer period of control and monitoring by adult corrections, increased deterrence, 
lower recidivism, better rehabilitation, retribution, swifter consequences, victim satisfaction, 
restitution, and permanent criminal record (Urbina, 2005, p. 161).  In addition, prosecutors 
believed that waivers were a good mechanism to keep society happy and a way to send a 
message that juvenile crime will not be tolerated. 
 Unlike the public defenders, few prosecutors reported problems in the system (Urbina, 
2005).  If anything, prosecutors felt that juveniles weren’t being waived to adult court soon 
enough.  Some prosecutors expressed belief that not enough juveniles were being waived to 
criminal court.  Problems reported were that social workers within the juvenile system were  
equipped to deal with at-risk-youth and that the juvenile system simply did not have enough 
resources.    
 Less than half of the prosecutors surveyed did report some negative consequences to 
waivers (Urbina, 2005).  Some of the problems referenced were permanent criminal record, loss 
of confidentiality, inability to handle adult prison, inability of probation officers to understand 
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teenage problems, limited treatment options in prison, victimization in adult prison, juveniles 
learning to be criminals in prison and negative impact on the juvenile’s development (Urbina, 
2005, p. 162).  In addition,  some prosecutors conceded that waiving juveniles is not changing 
their behaviors.  It is only a temporary remedy and soon hardened criminals will be released back 
into society.   
 Finally, Urbina (2005) surveyed judges in Wisconsin for their perspective.  Most judges 
agreed with the public defenders and the prosecutors on the objectives of waivers.  A majority of 
judges also conceded that a waiver increased the likelihood of a longer or harsher sentence.  
When asked about the benefits of waivers, the judges responded that waivers offered more 
severe sanctions, wider range of sentencing options, intense community supervision, greater 
accountability, community protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, retribution, more 
serious consequences for not complying, public satisfaction publicity (Urbina, 2005, pp. 164-
165). 
 Many of the judges surveyed reported critical problems with the current system (Urbina, 
2005).  In addition to some of the issues cited by public defenders and prosecutors, Judges in 
Wisconsin report that statutory guidelines are too vague and there is no uniformity in decisions.  
Decisions differ from county to county.   Judges also agreed with prior research to show that 
waivers are not a deterrent to future crime.  Most judges expressed belief that juveniles sent to 
prison simply learn how to be better criminals.  Judges also expressed belief that they received 
request to transfer certain juveniles because professionals in the system were worried about 
resources and simply wanted to wash their hands of problems.  The judges surveyed reported that 
waivers were also being disproportionately applied to poor and minorities. 
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 When asked about negative consequences of waivers, the judges cited many of the main 
concerns cited by public defenders and prosecutors (Urbina, 2005).  Specifically, judges were 
concerned with the inability of the juveniles to fully comprehend the adult system, juveniles only 
agreeing to waivers as part of a plea agreement, and the adult system forces juveniles to grow up 
too soon.  Judges in Wisconsin expressed concern that juveniles get lost in the adult system and 
develop negative and antisocial attitudes as a result of their experiences (Urbina, 2005, p. 166). 
 The Wisconsin legislature had good intentions when deciding to transfer 17-year-olds to 
the adult system.  In addition to the problems already discussed, a recent study found that the 
goal of deterrence has failed (Boggs et al., 2008).  A Wisconsin Legislative Audit estimated that 
recidivism rates for 17-year-olds to be approximately 48%, a figure almost three times higher 
than juveniles or adult incarcerated in age-appropriate facilities (Boggs et al. 2008, p. 9.)  
Additionally, the goal of making the juvenile justice system more efficient has also failed.  
Wisconsin’s juvenile justice system has become more expensive and less efficient.  The study by 
Boggs et al. (2008) also discovered that Wisconsin has a greater percentage of African-
Americans incarcerated than any other state.  Mendell (2011) reports that Wisconsin has the 
highest racial disproportionality of minority youth in the nation. 
Utah 
 The state of Utah relies on judicial waiver and statutory exclusions laws.  Utah Code 
Ann.§78A-6-103 grants the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over any child who has violated 
any law before turning 18-years of age.  The juvenile code has made exceptions to this section.  
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-701 grants the District Court exclusive jurisdiction of a minor over the 
age of 16 who has committed murder or aggravated murder, any felony after being previously 
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committed to secure confinement, or any violation of law after being previously certified to 
criminal court.  These are the only statutory exclusions to juvenile court jurisdiction. 
 The Utah Legislature has also established procedures for a juvenile court judge to waive a 
youth to district court.  Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702, or the Serious Youth Offender statute, 
allows the prosecutor to file a criminal information in the juvenile court for any youth age 16 and 
older who commits one of the following acts: aggravated arson, aggravated assault with bodily 
injury, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated sexual 
assault, felony discharge of a firearm, attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, or any 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon.  Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-703 places the 
burden on the prosecutor to prove that the juvenile should be prosecuted in adult court.  The 
judge will decide using several criteria including the seriousness of the offense, gang 
involvement, premediation, maturity, previous record, home environment, and likelihood of 
rehabilitation.   Juveniles who are waived to adult court have the right to appeal. 
 Snyder, Sickmund, and Poe-Yamagata (2000) studied Utah’s juvenile waiver system.  
Between 1988 and 1995, requests were made to transfer 225 youth to criminal court.  Most of the 
youth were male (96%), white (57%), and 17 (70%).  A majority of the youth had lengthy 
juvenile records having at least one formally handled referral and one prior adjudication.  
However, Snyder et al. (2000) found that less than half had previously been placed on probation 
or had completed a residential treatment program .   A majority of the requests involved serious 
person or property offenses.  However, in 40% of the cases involved less serious charges such as 
burglary.  Approximately 66% of the youth had accomplices, but most were  determined to be 
the primary offender.  Twenty percent of offenders were known gang members.  In addition, 
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32% of the youth used a firearm and 26% used a weapon other than a firearm.  In 20% of the 
cases, the victim required medical treatment. 
 Snyder et al. (2000) reported that waiver requests were approved in 76% of the cases (171 
youth).   A study of those waived revealed that the juvenile court was more likely to waive a 
minority youth than a white youth.  The court was also more likely to waive younger offenders 
rather than older offenders.  Juveniles with five or more formally handled cases were more likely 
to be waived than juveniles with one to four previous cases.  However, the court was also just as 
likely to waive youth who had no previous record.  Waiver was also just as likely for youth with 
no previous ordered placements as youth with three or more court-ordered placements.   
 Snyder et al. (2000) also studied patterns between the offense and waiver.  The court was 
more willing to transfer a youth charged with a serious person offense than youth charged with a 
less serious property offense.  Waiver was slightly more likely if the offender used a weapon.  If 
the victim was injured in the offense, it was almost certain the juvenile would be waived.  Gang 
affiliation did not have much of an impact.  Snyder et al. (2000) expressed concern with why 
first time offenders were being transferred.  Eighty-seven percent of waived cases involved use 
of a weapon and serious injury.  First time offenders accounted for 17% of these cases.  If a case 
did not involve serious injury, the courts looked more at previous record.   When cases were 
transferred to adult court, the most common outcome was confinement in prison or jail rather 
than probation.   
 Results of the Snyder et al. (2000) study was a factor in a decision for Utah to develop the 
Disproportionate Minority Contact Subcommittee of the Utah Board of Juvenile Justice (UBJJ, 
2012).  One main goal of the project is to eliminate the disproportionate representation of 
minority youth in the juvenile justice system.  As previous literature has pointed out, youth are 
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also over represented in waiver decisions throughout the country.  Statistics collected in Utah 
support this trend.   Utah has a predominately white population, followed by Hispanic and Native 
American. Minorities, particularly those of Hispanic descent, are waived more often than whites, 
when compared to population totals in Utah. 









2005 27,877 41 21 1 10 5 2 2 
2006 40,005 52 16 6 24 6 1 0 
2007 30,042 43 15 1 21 6 0 0 
2008 29,563 31 11 7 11 1 1 0 
2009 25,974 22 9 0 12 1 1 0 
Table 3.  Waivers in Utah from 2005-2009 by Race (UBJJ, 2012) 
 Issues have been raised questioning the constitutionality of Utah’s waiver statutes.  While 
many state’s changed their transfer laws in the 1990s in response to growing juvenile crime rates, 
Utah responded much earlier by enacting direct file legislation (Visser, 2011).  In 1987, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3a-25(6) read as follows:   
If the petition in the case of a person 14 years of age or older alleges that he committed an 
act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, and if the court after full 
investigation and a hearing finds it would be that it would be contrary to the best interests 
or of the public to retain jurisdiction, the court may enter an order certifying to that effect 
and directing that the child be held for criminal proceedings in the district court , with a 
hearing before a committing magistrate to be held as in other felony cases.  
 
The first challenge to the statute came in 1989 in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 405 (1989).  
 When he was 17, Bell shot a gas station attendant during a robbery.  Bell was convicted of 
attempted murder and aggravated robbery in district court.  On appeal, Bell challenged the 
waiver statute on the grounds that 1) being an adult violated both federal and state due process 
and equal protection clauses and 2) the statute granted unencumbered discretion to the prosecutor 
in waiver decisions (Visser, 2011).  The Court held that there is no special right to be treated as a 
juvenile offender.  Further, the court held that “the State interest in addressing the rise in the 
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number of crimes committed by juveniles as well as the growing recidivist rate among this group 
was sufficienty related to the classification scheme (Visser, 2011, p. 366). 
 The statute stood until 1995 when the Court reversed themselves in State v. Mohi, 901 
P.2d 991, 1002 (1995) (Visser, 2011).  Mohi and two accomplices were convicted of aggravated 
felonies in district court. On appeal, Mohi challenged the constitutionality of the statute.  In its 
decision, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the Bell decision ruling that the waiver statute 
allowed for arbitrary and sometimes abusive charging decisions.  Further, the Court held that the 
statute contemplated two separate classes of juvenile offenders resulting in a disparate impact.  
The Court concluded by ruling that although there was a legitimate need to try certain violent 
offenders as adults, legitimacy could not justify arbitrary means. 
 The Utah Legislature responded by amending the statute to giving the juvenile courts 
discretion over serious youth offenders (Visser, 2011).  Prosecutors were responsible to file a 
criminal information in court and show  probable cause why a youth should be waived.  An 
offender is responsible to prove three factors why they should remain in juvenile court.  In 2002, 
the Utah Legislature passed legislation giving the district court original jurisdiction over certain 
felonies committed by a youth at least 14 years of age.  In 2010, both statutes were amended 
again raising the age of possible waiver to age 16. 
 A case currently pending before the court  highlights another potential issue with Utah’s 
automatic waiver statute.  Jonatan Bustos is currently awaiting trial for murder in Utah’s Third 
District Court.  In 2010, at age 16, Bustos stabbed a classmate outside of a retail store.  Bustos 
claims he was acting in self-defense when the victim confronted him about a stolen iPod.  Under 
Utah’s statutory exclusion statute, Bustos was charged in district court.  However, Bustos 
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attorney argued that the facts supported a charge of manslaughter, a crime that is eligible for 
prosecution in juvenile court (Visser, 2011).  
In Utah, manslaughter is a lesser included offense to murder (Visser, 2011).  Therefore, 
the jury will have the option of finding Bustos guilty of manslaughter.  If that is the case, it is 
possible for Bustos to receive a sentence of 15 years.  If Bustos were found adjudicated of 
manslaughter in juvenile court, he would receive a sentence of five years.  Visser (2011) argues 
that the only effective safeguard against abuse of discretion is to provide juveniles a transfer 




SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Based upon the literature, many recommendations to current policy can be made. One 
recommendation is the elimination of statutory exclusion and prosecutorial discretion laws.  The 
problem of juvenile crime should remain in the juvenile system.  As the literature has shown, 
Judges are in the best position to determine if a youth should be prosecuted in adult court, or if 
they should remain in the juvenile system.  When the juvenile court was created, it was the 
express belief that juveniles needed a separate system operating under the goal of rehabilitation.   
It has been established that some youth transferred to the adult system are first time offenders 
who have not had the opportunity to participate in rehabilitation programs.  One factor in transfer 
is prior rehabilitative efforts and amenability to rehabilitation.  A waiver hearing will allow a 
judge to determine the possibility of rehabilitation.   
 Rehabilitation needs to be the number of the juvenile justice system.  In order to convince 
policy makers, the effectiveness of the juvenile rehabilitation system must be improved.   
Programs specifically targeted at reducing juvenile crime should be created or improved upon.  
One example of a program is California’s 8% solution.  In a three year study, Orange County, 
California probation officers discovered that 55% of juvenile crime was committed by 8% of 
offenders.  The county developed programs specifically targeting the 8%.  Services included 
mental and physical evaluations, personal and family counseling, job programs and placement 
services, and evening classes for the entire family.  A 2002 study found that participants had 
fewer petitions for new law violations and fewer were on warrant status when compared to youth 
who did not participate (Pagnanelli, 2007). 
Waiver hearings also reduce other problems caused by automatic waiver.  A problem was 
highlighted in the State of Utah with the case of Jonatan Bustos.  Underlying facts to murder or 
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automatic waiver charges are best left to judges to consider in the waiver process.  The return to 
hearing-based, judicially controlled waivers is a policy fully supported by the American Bar 
Association and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (Griffin, 2008). 
 Judges must follow all the criteria presented in Kent.  One of the criteria put forth by the 
Supreme Court asks judges to consider the maturity level of juveniles in their waiver decisions.  
The literature has made clear that juveniles are not on the same psychosocial maturity level as 
individuals who have reached adulthood.  If it does not already exist, all juvenile courts should 
develop an assessment tool to determine the psychological functioning of youth who face the 
possibility of adult court.  This will ensure fair and equitable justice by ensuring all youth who 
are transferred possess comparable capabilities with the adults they are judged alongside. 
 Another recommendation would be to establish a minimum age before a juvenile can be 
waived to adult court.   Some states have made it possible for youth as young as 10-years-old to 
be prosecuted as adults.  Flesch (2004) reports the findings of psychologists that believe 
juveniles under the age of fifteen are unlikely to possess the maturity or competency to fully 
appreciate the nature of their actions.  For this reason, children who are under 15 should never be 
waived to adult court.  There is concern that juveniles who commit serious crimes will not 
receive adequate punishments for serious crimes if they are sentenced to the juvenile system.   
As Bryan-Hancock & Casey (2010) discovered, some youth do not reach full 
psychosocial maturity until age 25.  If lawmakers are concerned with adequate punishment, they 
may consider extending the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction from age 21 to age 25.   The 
theory of life course development also supports this recommendation.  Increasing the legal age of 
adulthood would prolong an offender’s stay in the juvenile system offering more access to 
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rehabilitation programs and would be in accordance with the fact that most criminality tends to 
peak by late adolescence and decline thereafter (Pagnanelli, 2007). 
Another issue highlighted by the review of the literature was a youth’s awareness of 
juvenile transfer law.  Many youth who are transferred are either unaware of the possibility of 
prosecution in criminal court, or they simply do not believe they could be tried as adults.  The 
State of Georgia was one state who elected to automatically remove some juveniles from the 
jurisdiction of juvenile court for certain crimes.   To educate youth on the new laws, the state 
produced a video entitled “Multiple Choice” that explained the new laws and portrayed a picture 
of conditions within Georgia’s adult prisons.  The video was distributed to schools and was 
occasionally shown on local television stations.  The video proved an ineffective strategy.  In a 
study by Redding (2004), only 1/3 of juveniles who were tried as adults in Georgia under the 
automatic waiver were aware of the new laws.  If policy makers intend to use waiver laws as a 
deterrent to juvenile crime, a more effective way of educating at-risk-youth needs to be 
developed.   
It is necessary for some youth to be prosecuted as adults.  Juvenile waiver should be used 
as a mechanism to remove juveniles from the system who have exhausted all resources.   A 
recommendation to reduce the negative incarceration of youth in the adult system would be to 
offer specialized programing for juveniles.  One example of a successful program is Virginia’s 
youthful offender program.  Criminal court judges sentence youth between the ages of 16 and 21 
to indeterminate sentences.  Juveniles are housed separately from adult offenders.  Each 
individual is assessed and an individual treatment plan is created.  Participants participate in 
therapeutic services that include counseling and support groups, anger management, life skills 
training, substance abuse education, and mental health services (Redding, 2003).   
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 Further follow up in needed in the State of Wisconsin to study the effects of prosecuting 
17-year-olds in the adult system.  Categorically excluding an entire age group from the juvenile 
court has resulted in unanticipated consequences.  Prior to reform, waivers were being sought for 
17-year-olds already charge serious and violent offenses.  Altering the age of jurisdiction merely 
shifted nonviolent, first time offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the criminal 
court. In addition to problems previously discussed, waiver petitions for 16-year-olds increased 
90% in Milwaukee County in the first year after new law took effect.  Prior to the reform, 
waivers for 16-year-olds were not sought to the same extent as 17-year-olds.  Merely being 16 
increased a juvenile’s odds of waiver (Torbet et al., 2000).  In 2007, legislation to change the age 
of original jurisdiction back to 18 failed.  Improved data collection and evaluation of the current 
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Demographic characteristics of cases waived to criminal courts 





1989 8,000 <50 900 2,100 4,900 7,600 400 4,000 3,900 3,700 200 <50 
1990 8,700 <50 800 2,400 5,400 8,300 400 4,100 4,500 4,300 200 100 
1991 10,800 <50 1,100 3,000 6,700 10,300 500 5,100 5,700 5,500 100 100 
1992 11,300 <50 1,400 3,400 6,500 10,900 400 5,500 5,800 5,600 200 100 
1993 12,200 100 1,600 3,500 7,000 11,600 600 6,200 6,000 5,700 200 100 
1994 13,800 100 1,900 4,000 7,800 13,000 800 7,500 6,300 5,900 300 100 
1995 12,900 100 2,200 3,800 6,800 12,100 800 7,000 5,900 5,600 200 100 
1996 13,100 100 2,200 3,900 7,000 12,200 800 7,400 5,600 5,300 300 100 
1997 12,700 100 1,900 3,500 7,100 11,800 900 7,600 5,100 4,700 300 100 
1998 11,700 100 1,800 3,000 6,900 10,600 1,100 7,500 4,300 3,900 300 100 
1999 10,500 100 1,700 2,600 6,000 9,400 1,000 6,700 3,800 3,400 200 100 
2000 9,200 100 1,400 2,000 5,700 8,200 1,000 6,000 3,200 2,800 200 100 
2001 8,100 100 1,200 1,800 5,000 7,200 800 5,200 2,900 2,500 200 100 
2002 8,700 100 1,300 2,500 4,900 7,800 1,000 5,900 2,900 2,600 200 100 
2003 8,500 100 1,200 2,300 4,900 7,700 900 5,700 2,800 2,500 200 100 
2004 8,300 <50 1,200 2,300 4,700 7,300 900 5,400 2,900 2,600 200 <50 
2005 8,400 <50 1,200 2,400 4,800 7,500 900 5,200 3,200 2,900 200 100 
2006 8,800 <50 1,200 2,500 5,100 8,000 900 5,200 3,600 3,200 300 100 
2007 8,900 100 1,100 2,400 5,300 8,000 900 5,300 3,600 3,300 300 100 
2008 8,800 <50 1,100 2,300 5,400 8,000 800 4,900 3,900 3,600 300 100 
2009 7,600 <50 800 1,900 4,900 6,800 800 4,500 3,200 2,900 200 100 
Note: The estimates in this table are rounded to the nearest 100. 
 Puzzanchera, C. and Kang, W. (2012). "Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985-2009."Online. Available:  
 http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/ 






Cases Waived to Criminal Court by Offense 
Year Person Property Drugs Public Order Total 
1989 2433 3750 1235 555 7973 
1990 2943 3812 1228 674 8657 
1991 3635 4538 1826 773 10772 
1992 4125 4869 1371 903 11268 
1993 5104 4652 1369 1101 12226 
1994 5787 5204 1620 1232 13843 
1995 5525 4630 1672 1054 12881 
1996 5397 5003 1721 957 13079 
1997 4952 4846 1817 1079 12694 
1998 4367 4383 1820 1168 11738 
1999 4137 3668 1518 1140 10464 
2000 3554 3263 1378 1038 9232 
2001 3355 2706 1209 817 8086 
2002 3395 3254 1231 839 8719 
2003 3358 3121 1231 815 8525 
2004 3556 2636 1208 860 8260 
2005 4013 2415 1137 868 8433 
2006 4218 2641 1160 812 8831 
2007 4243 2614 1205 846 8908 
2008 4325 2567 1074 854 8820 
2009 3534 2336 978 794 7642 
Total 85957 76905 29009 19180 211052 
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